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Philippine Technocracy and the Politics of Economic 
Decision-Making: A Comparison of the Martial Law  
and Post-Martial Law Periods
Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem*
This article looks into the factors which have strengthened as well as weakened 
Philippine technocracy during the martial law (1972–86) and post-martial law peri-
ods.  During the former, technocracy drew its strength from the support it received 
from President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the country’s major international lending 
creditors, i.e., the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.  Both 
Marcos and the IMF/World Bank shared the technocrats’ economic vision of liber-
alization and export-oriented industrialization.  Among the factors which hindered 
the technocracy’s bargaining leverage on the other hand were the inability of the 
leadership to address the economic crisis as brought about by the oil price hike in 
the early 1980s and the political crisis which was given impetus with the assassina-
tion of ex-Senator Benigno Aquino.  As for the post-martial law period, the technoc-
racy basically pursued the same economic policy liberalization as during the martial 
law period with an emphasis on privatization and deregulation.  Technocratic policy-
making was further facilitated in a period of globalization where the transnational 
character of economic policy-making further protected the technocracy from public 
criticism.  Its economic policy-making, however, confronted stiff challenges from 
civil society as well as patronage politics.
Keywords: Philippine technocracy, Ferdinand E. Marcos, International 
 Monetary Fund, World Bank, liberalization, Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, civil society, patronage politics
Introduction
Despite their being banished to the “Hall of Shame” during the 1986 People Power 
Revolution in the Philippines, technocracy has continued to persist in the country’s 
transition from authoritarian rule to democracy and up to the present.  Instead, however, 
of being called “technocrats,” they are now referred to as “economic managers.”  The 
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change in “name” is quite understandable because during the martial law period (1972–
86), technocracy became synonymous with the repression which occurred during that 
era foremost of which was economic development at all costs, e.g., dislocation, militariza-
tion, and elimination of communities which got in the way of development projects.  This 
reputation, therefore, earned the technocrats the “(dis)honor” of being referred to as the 
third leg of the stool which propped up the authoritarian regime, the other two of which 
were the military and Marcos’ relatives/cronies.  Thus, the administrations which fol-
lowed that of the Marcos government were conscious not to “hire” any of these techno-
crats, particularly, those who came from the World Bank (hereinafter referred to as WB) 
and the International Monetary Fund (hereinafter referred to as IMF).  But the post-
martial technocrats, however, continued their predecessors’ policies of liberalization, 
free competition, and free trade but now under a neoliberal economic dispensation.  The 
question which emerges is why this is the case when technocracy in the Philippines is 
not able to sustain the economic growth which was seen in the 1950s when the country 
was second to Japan as having the best economy in Asia and then left-behind in the 1970s 
by its East Asian counterparts as among the newly industrializing countries in the region. 
In the 1980s, on the other hand, Philippine economic policies failed to bring it at par with 
its Southeast Asian neighbors, i.e., Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, which all became 
New Asian Tigers.  The latest blow to the country is that socialist Vietnam, a late comer 
to the capitalist world, has economically overtaken the Philippines.
This article, therefore, explores the factors which have strengthened as well as 
weakened Philippine technocracy during the martial law and post-martial law periods.  It 
shows that in general the political leverage of the technocrats came from the support 
they have received from the leadership who shares their economic vision and the coun-
try’s major international lending creditors, the IMF and the WB.  The weakening of their 
political clout, on the other hand, is brought about by the inability of the leadership to 
address the political and economic crisis.  The first section of this article will discuss the 
rise of Philippine technocracy during the pre-martial law period (1960s–72) and the eco-
nomic debates which ensued during that period concerning the trajectory of Philippine 
development.  This establishes the very foundation of the strength of Philippine tech-
nocracy.  The second section, on the other hand, examines the crucial role they played 
during the martial law period, particularly the economic perspectives they espoused and 
the challenges these confronted.  And lastly, the third section will discuss where Philip-
pine technocracy is headed in a period of “elite democracy” as it confronts challenges to 
its neoliberal development paradigm and massive corruption.
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Defining the Technocracy and Their Development Vision1)
Technocracy is a rule by experts, a temporary form of rule that sometimes emerges 
after a period of poor governance.  The term implies rule by specialists with expertise 
in non-political subjects, often economics and engineering.2)  These “engineers” com-
prised a “critical new stratum in the industrial production process.”3)  They are also 
referred to as “the scientists, including physicists, mathematicians, chemists, engi-
neers, computer program and others who work in varying degrees of applied or pure 
research” (Glassman et al. 1993, 84).  “Historically, the theory and practice of tech-
nocracy have been political and ideological responses to industrialization and techno-
logical progress” (Glassman et al. 1993).  The trend toward the appointment of tech-
nocrats into key government agencies in the Philippines began during the Macapagal 
Adminis tration (1960–64) where Filipino graduates from the best foreign universi-
ties were recruited to government agencies.  These included among others Sixto K. 
Roxas,4) and Armand Fabella5) who both served as Director-General of the Program 
Implementation Agency (hereinafter referred to as PIA)6) during the time of President 
Diosdado  Macapagal.  During this period, the technocracy, through their respective 
agencies, pressed for an open door policy to foreign investments and foreign loans, 
mainly from the IMF.  Roxas was also known to be the architect of the Philippine 
financial system.
It was, however, under the first and second terms of the Marcos Administration 
(1965–71) when more technocrats were recruited into government and further impor-
tance was given to them.  Among those Marcos recruited during this period were Cesar 
1) For further details, please see Tadem (2005).
2) Hague and Harrop (2004, 99).  The word was coined by William Smyth, “an engineer based in 
California who founded Technocracy, Inc., in 1919.”
3) Veblen (1963) in Glassman et al. (1993).
4) Roxas graduated summa cum laude in economics from the elite all-male school of Ateneo de Manila. 
He went on to obtain an M.A. in Economics at Fordham University.
5) Fabella earned an economics degree from Harvard University and an M.A. in Economics from Jose 
Rizal College which is owned by his family.  He also pursued post-graduate studies at the London 
School of Economics.  His wife is a niece of Sixto Roxas III.
6) The PIA was organized to implement the government’s socio-economic plan but it seemed to be 
more concerned in their implementation.  It was created on August 24, 1962 to be President  Diosdado 
Macapagal’s technical staff.  The agency conducted socio-economic planning, formulated policy 
recommendations, established priorities, and programmed the utilization of public funds, man-
power resources, materials, and equipment (Official Directory of the Republic of the Philippines 
1955, 153).
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E.A. Virata7) and Placido Mapa Jr.8) Virata brought in Gerardo Sicat Jr.,9) after reading an 
article on his views supporting trade and export liberalization which Virata supported.10) 
Another technocrat closely associated with Virata is Manuel Alba Jr.,11) who was his 
student and faculty at the University of the Philippines College of Business Administra-
tion (hereinafter referred to as UP CBA) when Virata served as Dean from 1960 to 1967. 
Also identified with Virata’s economic orientation was Vicente Paterno12) whom Virata 
together with Mapa brought in as Chairman of the Board of Investments in 1970.  Armand 
7) Virata obtained a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering and B.S. in Business Administration in 1952, 
University of the Philippines (hereinafter referred to as UP) after which he went on to become an 
instructor at the UP College of Business Administration (UP CBA).  A year later, he pursued an 
M.B.A. in Industrial Management from the Wharton Graduate School, University of Pennsylvania 
in 1953.  He became UP CBA Dean before he joined the government in 1967.  During the pre-
martial law period, Virata served among others as Presidential Economic Staff Deputy Director-
General for Investments from 1967 to 1968; Undersecretary of the Department of Commerce and 
Industry from 1967 to 1968; Director and Acting Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine 
National Bank from 1967 to 1969; and Secretary of Finance from 1970 to 1986.
8) Mapa graduated from Ateneo de Manila in 1955, magna cum laude and pursued post graduate stud-
ies at St. Louis University from 1955 to 1957 and obtained an M.A. and Ph.D. in Economics from 
Harvard University.  He served as Undersecretary of Finance in 1965, Deputy Director General, 
Program Implementation Agency, Office of the President in 1966, and Director General, Presiden-
tial Economic Staff, Office of the President in 1966.
9) Sicat earned three degrees from the UP: B.S. Foreign Service (cum laude), 1957; A.B. (cum laude), 
1958; and M.A. in Economics, 1958.  He earned his Ph.D. in Economics in 1963 at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) in Cambridge, Massachusetts, the United States.  Sicat was Chair of 
the National Economic Council during the pre-martial law period.
10) Virata, Cesar E.A. 2008.  Interview by Cayetano Paderanga Jr. and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.  June 16.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
11) Alba graduated Bachelor of Science with a Business Administration degree from the UP (Account-
ing).  In 1958, he obtained his Professional License as a Certified Public Accountant.  In 1957, he 
was recruited by Virata when he was Dean of the UP CBA as assistant instructor (to full professor 
in 1962) of Business Policy, Business Administration and Marketing, College of Business Admin-
istration.  From 1961–64, he served as Assistant Dean and Acting Dean, College of Business Admin-
istration and Director, Graduate Studies Program, UP CBA.  Virata was responsible for obtaining a 
fellowship for him to obtain a Master of Business Administration (Marketing and Transportation) 
at the University of Minnesota in 1961.  He later on graduated Ph.D. in Management Science and 
Business Administration (with Marketing, Economics, Transportation Management, Operations 
Research and Social Psychology as specialized areas) at Northwestern University (Chicago and 
Evanstan, Illinois, the United States) in 1967.  He served in 1971 as Executive Director, Philippine 
Presidential Commission to Survey Philippine Education (with the Commission chaired by former 
Department of Education, Culture and Sports [DECS] Secretary, Onofre D. Corpuz).
12) Paterno graduated Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering at the UP in 1948 where he and 
Virata were contemporaries at the UP College of Engineering.  He obtained a Master of Business 
Administration at Harvard University in 1953.
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Fabella continued on from the Macapagal Administration to join the Marcos Administra-
tion.  The expertise, of these technocrats, continued to be drawn mainly by their access 
to education both locally and abroad, i.e., they were US graduates in economics, law, and 
business administration.13)
These technocrats exemplified the concept of “technocracy” which emerged in the 
1950s as a spin-off of the Keynesian revolution which placed emphasis on the role of 
government intervention in the economy.  Technocracy was looked upon as a select 
few who had the expertise in economics management and thus could take on the lead in 
this endeavor on behalf of the government.  As developed further by the IMF and the 
WB in the 1960s, technocracy was made to look at itself as an elite corps of experts who 
have the last word in development planning (Bello et al. 1982, 28).  This view allies 
itself closely to the emergence of what is referred to as the “new technocrat” which 
has been looked at as an “important element in administration not just in production” 
 (Glassman 1997).  Moreover, they are regarded as “knowledge experts” and are 
“employed and controlled by the middle and elite managers of the corporation, govern-
ment bureaucracy and universities of which they are affiliated” (Glassman et al. 1993). 
An interesting phenomenon is that “technocrats do become members of the management 
hierarchy in some cases, but they accede to power not as technocrats but as managers.14) 
The technical expertise of the technocrats therefore establishes their source of political 
leverage which is not only needed by the leadership but by international lending institu-
tions such as the IMF and the WB.  Their economic expertise was also needed in a period 
whereby the Philippine economy was growing and expanding of which the state plays a 
primarily role.
Nationalists vs Free Market Technocrats
The technocrats whom Marcos would maintain when he declared martial law, however, 
also possessed another important political and economic pertinence to the leadership and 
this was the economic vision they carried.  One of these was Sicat who led an attack on 
the country’s import substitution policy and advocated for an export-oriented industrial-
ization which they argued would benefit the country which has an abundant surplus of 
labor and natural resources.15)  Moreover, these technocrats campaigned for the decontrol 
13) The others were Secretary of Trade and Industry Vicente Paterno and his successor Roberto  Ongpin, 
Secretary of Agriculture Arturo Tanco, and Central Bank Governor Placido Mapa, all of whom got 
their degrees from Harvard University.
14) Kellner and Heuberger (1992) in Glassman et al. (1993).
15) Lichauco (1981).
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program which they described as a return to free trade.  These technocrats some of whom 
have undergone training with the IMF and the WB which advocated for these policies, 
assumed the role of the major implementers of “free enterprise” in the country.  They 
lectured the Filipino business community to “rationalize their operations, stop asking 
for government protection and meet their multinational competitors on an equal basis 
in the free market.”16)  This highlighted the growing rift between the two crucial eco-
nomic planning agencies, i.e., the technocrat-dominated PIA and the traditionally- 
nationalistic National Economic Council (hereinafter referred to as NEC)17) headed by 
Hilarion  Henares.18)  The former won out as the leadership preferred their economic 
vision over the latter.
Despite the leadership’s support, the technocrats during the pre-martial law period 
also had to contend with the powerfully entrenched politico-economic elites who were 
mainly represented by vast landowning families who were expanding to the manufactur-
ing sector in the 1950s.  Dealing with them highlighted the differences among the tech-
nocrats in the Philippine Economic Staff (hereinafter referred to as PES).  For example, 
Sicat wanted a more rapid approach to liberalization but Virata was more cautious as not 
to antagonize the influential political families who were against this.  Virata supported 
the concept of measured capacity which was advocated by David Sycip, President of the 
Philippine Chamber Industries whereby one has to determine the national market plus 
export to calculate measured capacity.19)  This was to prevent wasting capital by over-
investment and was seen to address the issue of having to deal with different families in 
the country wanting to invest on the same thing.  Sicat did not agree with this as it went 
against the principles of free market economy.  But he ultimately followed Virata.20)
The continued rift between the nationalist and the free market advocates was also 
highlighted in the Philippine Congress during the pre-martial law period when Virata, 
pushed for the passing of the 1967 Investments Incentives Act through the support of 
Marcos’ key party mates in the Nacionalista Party namely, Congressman Lorenzo 
16) Constantino and Constantino (1978).
17) The NEC which was reconstituted by Secretary of Finance Miguel Cuaderno during the time of 
President Manuel Roxas was tasked to prepare economic plans and to define the country’s major 
economic policies and objectives.  It, however, has no implementing powers, except on foreign 
economic assistance (The Manila Times, December 25, 1947; January 17, 1955; Philippine Govern-
ment Directory [1980, 1]; Araneta [1965, 247]).
18) Henares is a graduate of Ateneo de Manila, UP, and obtained his Ph.D. in Economics from the MIT.
19) Virata, Cesar E.A. 2007. Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga, and Teresa S. 
 Encarnacion Tadem.  Tape recording.  December 19. RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
20) Virata, Cesar E.A. 2007. Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga, and Teresa S. 
 Encarnacion Tadem.  Tape recording.  November 21.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
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Sarmiento who was the chairman for economic affairs in the House of Representatives 
and Senator Jose Diokno who was the chairman of the Committee on Economic Affairs 
in the Senate.21)  They succeeded to have the investments act passed despite opposition 
from no less than Senate President Gil Puyat who was also the head of the National 
Economic Protection Association (NEPA).  Puyat was backed by politico-economic fam-
ilies in Congress who feared that the investments act will undermine their local busi-
nesses, such as textile, cement, flour milling among others.  They wanted more protec-
tion for their industries and further support for the import-substitution scheme rather 
than an export-oriented industrialization which was being pushed by the Virata techno-
crats.22)  Because of this, the Virata-led technocrats, could not pursue the country’s entry 
in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT) to further liberalize the economy. 
The Philippines, therefore, missed out on the Kennedy Round.23)  An important policy 
which was also pursued by the Virata-led technocrats with the backing of Marcos was 
the devaluation of the peso to give further impetus to an export-oriented industrialization 
policy.  For the Virata free-market technocrats, they needed Marcos to convince the 
influential families engaged in import-substitution who would be adversely affected by 
this, to accept such a policy.24)
During the pre-martial law period, therefore, the political leverage of the martial law 
technocrats would come from their technical expertise and the support they received 
from President Marcos as well as his political allies in Congress.  Such a support was able 
to neutralize their two major nemesis which were the technocrats in the NEC and the 
politico-economic elites in Congress and the business community.  For the latter, such 
a “neutralization” came also in the form of negotiations among politicians and members 
of the business community which also the martial law technocrats “compromising” their 
economic policies.  But in general, they believed that they were able to get what they 
wanted.
21) Virata, Cesar E.A. 2007.  November 21.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
22) Virata, Cesar E.A. 2007.  November 21.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
23) Virata, Cesar E.A. 2007.  November 21.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines; and Virata, Cesar 
E.A. 2008. Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga, and Teresa S.  Encarnacion Tadem. 
Tape recording.  May 2.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
24) Virata, Cesar E.A. 2007. Interview by Yutaka Katayama and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem.  Tape 
recording.  November 23.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
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The Philippine Technocracy and Economic Decision-Making during the 
Martial Law Period25)
The prominence of the free-market technocracy clique in the Philippines further gained 
ground during the martial law period, i.e., 1972–86.  Although Virata personally felt that 
there was no need for martial law as Marcos was able to have his economic policies 
passed, he also saw the advantage of not subjecting the technocrats’ policies to time-
consuming debates in the Philippine Congress.  Martial law for him allowed their imme-
diate implementation.26)  This was because executive, legislative, and judicial powers 
were all vested in the President who gave his technocrats the liberty to run the country’s 
economy.  The right to strike, picket, demonstrate, and other forms of protest were all 
taken away to give a facade of political stability in order to attract more multinational 
corporations.  This enabled the efficient pursuit of technocracy’s pet projects.  Thus, 
when “supported by a strong political leader, these specialists were able to impose harsh 
monetary remedies on countries where financial discipline had often taken second place 
to political requirements” (Hague and Harrop 2004, 99).  Such a phenomenon was also 
common in Third World societies whereby the
bureaucracy has undoubtedly played a positive role in most authoritarian regimes that have expe-
rienced rapid economic growth.  (. . .) O’Donnell (1973) coined the term “bureaucratic authori-
tarianism” to describe Latin American countries such as Brazil and Argentina in which bureaucratic 
technocrats, protected by a repressive military government, imposed a more modern economy 
against opposition from social groups. (ibid., 306)
A capitalist authoritarian state-led development under an authoritarian regime also 
augured well for the technocrats as their
emphasis on the rational coordination of institutional processes to the functioning requirements of 
the productive system gives rise to a uniquely administrative or managerial conception of the state. 
Historically technocrats have viewed the state as a positive instrument in the pursuit of economic 
and social progress.  The reason for this stems from the state’s central position in society.  Essen-
tially, the state is the only institution capable of engaging in a comprehensive system wide planning 
and management. (Fischer 1989, 25)
Technocracy’s attitude towards martial rule in the country was expectedly shared 
by the United States and its financial institutions, i.e., the WB and the IMF.  They saw 
25) For further details please see Tadem (2005).
26) Virata, Cesar E.A. 2007. Interview by Yutaka Katayama and Cayetano Paderanga.  Tape recording. 
December 13.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
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how local technocracy was having a difficult time implementing policies favoring foreign 
capital because of opposition from the nationalist economists among others.  Under an 
authoritarian regime, any opposition to the government could easily be silenced (Tadem 
1985).  During the martial law period, therefore one witnessed the emergence of the rule 
by experts which “provided an instance where technical, depoliticized views of an edu-
cated elite came to dominate the political agenda” (Hague and Harrop 2004, 99).  Tech-
nocracy inevitably became one of the major pillars of the martial law regime not only 
because of their internationally recognized economic expertise but more importantly, 
because they provided the leadership with a credible development program which was 
endorsed by the agents of foreign capital.  Major aspects of this were the transformation 
of the Philippine economy into an export-oriented one and national progress through the 
massive entry of foreign capital, i.e., foreign investments and loans as well as the removal 
of all restrictions on trade (Tadem 1985).
The free-market technocracy clique greatly benefited from this led by Virata who 
retained his post as Secretary of Finance.  He was supported by Gerardo Sicat Jr. who 
became the first Director-General of the National Economic and Development Authority 
(hereinafter referred to as NEDA) and concurrent Secretary of Economic Planning.  He 
served in this capacity until July 1981.  The NEDA was the result of the fusion of the PIA 
and the NEC, the two economic agencies of technocracy which Marcos abolished in 1972. 
Mapa served as Executive Director of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (WB in 1979) having previously worked in the IMF in 1972.27)  Paterno 
continued to serve the martial law regime as chairman of the Board of Investments until 
1979 and concurrently Secretary of Industry from 1974 to 1979.  Alba, on the other hand, 
went on to become Minister28) of Budget from 1981 to 1986.29)  Virata also brought in 
another of his bright student and professor and former Dean of UP CBA, Jaime Laya30) 
who served as the Secretary (and then Minister in 1981) of Budget from 1975 to 1981 
27) Ibon Facts and Figures (1984).
28) In 1981, the Philippines shifted from a presidential to a presidential-parliamentary system, thus the 
change in reference to the titles and agencies from Secretaries of Departments to Ministers of 
Ministries.
29) Before that, Alba upon the declaration of martial law continued with his government position as 
Executive Director, Philippine Presidential Commission to Survey Philippine Education until 1973. 
From 1975 to 1981 he became NEDA Deputy Director-General (Undersecretary).  He was appointed 
as Deputy Secretary of the Budget from 1979 to 1981 while concurrently Deputy Director-General 
of NEDA.
30) Laya graduated B.S. in Business Administration at the UP in 1957.  He obtained his M.S. industrial 
management at Georgia Institute of Technology in 1961 and Ph.D. in financial management at 
Stanford University in 1966.
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and Chairman of the Monetary Board and Governor of Central Bank of the Philippines 
from 1981 to 1984.  He later on became Minister of Education, Culture and Sports from 
1984 to 1986.  Through these economic agencies, i.e., Department of Finance, Depart-
ment of Budget, NEDA, the Central Bank, Department of Industry, and Board of Invest-
ments, the Virata-led clique continued its role as the point person in accessing and nego-
tiating loans from international lending agencies, mainly the WB, the IMF, and the Asian 
Development Bank (hereinafter referred to as ADB).  There were, however, also differ-
ences within this faction with Sicat wanting a more rapid approach to export- oriented 
industrialization and liberalization but with Paterno wanting a more cautious approach.31) 
Conflict within this faction was settled by Virata.32)
Challenges to the Free-market Technocrat Faction
During the martial law period, there was, however, a different set of challenges, which 
the Virata-led faction of the technocracy confronted.  This was no longer coming from 
the Philippine Congress but from other key players in economic decision-making.
One technocrat which the Virata technocrat clique had differences with was Roberto 
“Bobby” Ongpin33) who became head of the Department of Trade and Industry (here-
inafter referred to as DTI) from 1979 to 1986 when Marcos decided to fuse the Board of 
Investments and Department of Trade into one.  In the process, the Virata faction lost 
one of its chief ally in this agency, Paterno as his position was abolished and he was made 
Secretary of Public Works and Highways.  The Virata faction did not like Ongpin’s push 
for the country to pursue one of ASEAN’s 11 industrial projects in the 1970s which was 
to build an integrated steel mill.  Virata felt that the country could not afford the cost of 
this.34)  Ongpin, together with Marcos, however felt that this was necessary in order for 
the country to have a heavy industrial base.  The IMF/WB, like Virata, did not also adhere 
to this scheme which led to the mothballing of the 11 major industrial projects because 
31) Paterno, Vicente E. 2008. Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Temario Rivera, and Teresa S. Encarnacion 
Tadem.  Tape recording.  August 15.  11th Floor, Columbia Tower, Ortigas Ave., Mandaluyong, 
Philippines.
32) Virata, Cesar E.A. 2007. December 19.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
33) Ongpin obtained his Bachelor’s degree from Ateneo de Manila and MBA from Harvard University. 
Paterno replaced Baltazar Aquino as Secretary of Public Works and Highway, who did not have a 
good reputation.  Paterno did not like his role as “sanitizer” and in 1981 left the Marcos government 
and became a member of the opposition (Virata, Cesar E.A. 2008. Interview by Cayetano Paderanga 
and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem.  Tape recording.  September 30, RCBC Plaza, Makati City, 
Philippines.)
34) Virata, Cesar E.A.  2008.  Interview by Cayetano Paderanga, Temario Rivera, and Teresa S.  Encarnacion. 
Tape recording.  July 29.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
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of the failure of the state to acquire foreign loans to finance this.35)
The Virata technocracy faction did not also have the power over the Marcos cronies 
who were in control of certain key agencies, namely the sugar and coconut industries. 
These were mainly Marcos “chief cronies,” Roberto “Bobby” Benedicto and Eduardo 
“Danding” Cojuangco in the latter.  These two industries also happen to be the major 
export dollar earners for the country.  Virata was against the coconut levy which was 
imposed by Cojuangco on the coconut farmers.36)  He argued that this levy should be 
abolished because it only further depresses the already low price paid to farmers for 
their copra and was not at all for the benefit of the coconut farmers (Bowring 1981, 
50–52).  Virata also wanted to put an end to the middle-man monopoly by crony- 
controlled and state-created bodies in both the coconut and sugar industries.  This was 
in compliance with the wishes of the IMF/WB group (ibid.).  President Marcos initially 
sided with Virata and agreed to have the levy abolished but later reversed his decision 
during a cabinet meeting when Virata was abroad.  Virata was said to have offered his 
resignation which Marcos refused.  The former just consoled himself by saying that he 
would not abandon the struggle for economic liberalization (ibid.).  The Virata faction 
also could not totally restrain the lavish spending of the First Lady.  Mrs. Marcos, for 
example got USD111,111 from the coffers of the Ministry of Human Settlements which 
she headed (Sacerdoti 1983).  She also had her own technocrats led by Conrado “Jolly” 
Benitez.37)
The technocrats, therefore, basically saw themselves as the bulwark against crony 
capitalism (Business International Research Division 1980).  This move by the Virata 
faction was supported by the IMF/WB who also feared that crony monopoly of vital 
industries in the Philippines would ward off present as well as potential foreign investors 
in the country because of the absence of competition and free enterprise.  The IMF/WB 
also saw that corruption coupled with growing mass unrest had to be addressed politically 
with the lifting of martial law and the declaration of a New Republic in 1981 with Virata 
as Prime Minister backed by a Cabinet composed of WB technocrats, i.e., Virata’s fac-
tion.38)  What the Virata faction and the IMF/WB, however, underestimated was the 
disillusionment of the business community, an important ally of the Virata faction against 
crony capitalism, with regards to the economic policies particularly with the country’s 
economic downturn in 1981 onwards which was triggered by the Mexican default of 
35) Lichauco (1981, 60).
36) Virata, Cesar E.A.  2008.  May 2.  RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
37) Benitez obtained his Bachelor’s degree from Ateneo de Manila and M.A. and Ph.D. in Stanford 
University in development planning and development education, 1970.
38) Bello et al. (1982, 28).
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1982 leading to the tightening of credit lines to the country.39)  The business community 
had a positive view of the technocrats.  They “sought to encourage what they perceived 
as a measure of independence between the technocrats and the cronies” (de Dios 1988, 
104).  Furthermore, the big business community even perceived themselves as a hold 
out as a possible constituency for the technocrats against the cronies (ibid., 105).  But 
such a perspective was not sustained with the growing disillusionment of the business 
community with technocracy’s economic policies.  It, for example, articulated that the 
country’s economic crisis was not only due to the inability of the regime to curb graft and 
corruption and the lack of accountability of public officers but also because of the failed 
major economic policies of the technocrats which were formulated without consulting 
them.  Its members accused the technocrats of being “too bureaucratic, arrogant and 
lacking in practical experience.”40)  Local businesses also voiced its resentment concern-
ing the bailout of crony companies at the expense of others which did not have the proper 
connections to the regime and thus could not avail of the regime’s rescue funds (Bello 
et al. 1982, 28).  These businessmen showed their disapproval of the technocracy’s blind 
loyalty to the policies of the IMF/WB group which led to the centralization and the 
streamlining of the local economy benefitting only the foreign investors and their local 
counterparts.  All these have led to the gradual elimination of small- and medium-scale 
industries and commercial establishments in the country and foreign domination of the 
economy (ibid.).
Prominent members of the business community, therefore, joined the growing anti-
dictatorship movement along with victims of human rights violations and dislocated 
 communities to pave the way for development projects instigated by technocracy.  The 
technocrats were also blamed for encouraging an apolitical and pro-business atmosphere 
which gave the leadership a “legitimate” excuse to depoliticize the Filipino people.  This 
was implemented in various forms, e.g. the elimination of leaders of national movements 
and the denial of civilian rights (Stauffer 1979).  Repressive labor policies included the 
prohibition of the right to strike by both the workers and the rural peasantry and the 
disbandment and constant harassment of labor unions by the state.  These actions were 
implemented with the excuse that these labor activities were a threat to internal security 
(Lim 1983).  The exacerbation of the economic crisis by the political instability caused 
by the assassination of ex-Senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino, a staunch Marcos opposi-
tionist who was deemed to be the next Philippine President if Marcos did not declare 
39) Virata, Cesar E.A.  2008.  September 30, RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.  Virata, Cesar E.A. 
2007.  November 21, RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
40) Bowring (1981, 50).
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martial law, further fueled the anti-dictatorship movement.  With the ascendance of his 
widow, Corazon C. Aquino as the symbol of this movement, this gave the United States 
an pliable alternative to Marcos.  These political events pressured Marcos to call for the 
February 1986 snap elections where the public believed that Mrs. Aquino was cheated 
by Marcos paving the way for the 1986 People Power Revolution and with the downfall 
of Marcos also went with him his technocrats.
The political leverage which the technocrats, therefore, had during the martial law 
period continued to be the support which they got from the leadership.  Such a support, 
however, was severely compromised with President Marcos’ privileging the other power 
blocs which included no less than the faction of the First Lady and his “chief cronies,” 
Cojuangco and Benedicto.  The reality was that “Marcos and his cronies used access to 
the political machinery to accumulate wealth, and—like the major families of the pre-
martial law years—had little loyalty to any particular sector” (de Dios and Hutchcroft 
2003, 49).  The situation was also not helped much that there were other factions within 
the technocracy as exemplified by Ongpin and Velasco.  One source of political leverage 
which the Virata-faction could pull from was IMF- and WB-support.  This was heightened 
when these two international lending institutions saw the technocrats as a bulwark 
against corruption.  What ultimately pulled down the technocrats, however, was the 
country’s political and economic crisis leading to the pulling out of US support, and 
 consequently, the IMF’s and the WB’s, for Marcos.  This was further fueled by the anti-
dictatorship movement against the authoritarian regime’s corruption and human rights 
violations in general and the withdrawal of business community support for the techno-
crats in what its members perceived as the government’s failed economic policies.
The Philippine Technocracy during the Post-Martial Law Period 41)
Despite the downfall of the Marcos technocrats, the Aquino Administration (1986–92) 
and the succeeding administrations of Ramos (1992–98), Estrada (1998–2001), and 
Arroyo (2001–10) had no problem in recruiting technocrats who shared the same eco-
nomic perspective, i.e., liberalization, free competition, and free market as their coun-
terparts during the Marcos administration.  This is understandable as they generally came 
41) For further details please see Tadem (2005).  Because Marcos “lifted” martial law in 1981, people 
would refer to that year as to the end of martial law.  There are those, however, who believe that 
this was an “artificial” lifting of martial law as Marcos continued to maintain authoritarian powers 
like Amendment 6 as earlier on discussed in this article.  The author is of this view that the article 
refers to the post-martial law period with the ascendance of Mrs. Corazon Aquino in power.
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from the same background as the Marcos technocrats, namely, they were US-educated. 
Like their predecessors, a number of them also came from the UP, the alma mater of the 
majority of the technocrats particularly from the UP School of Economics (hereinafter 
referred to as UPSE).42)
The source of political power of technocracy during the post-martial law period 
would continue to be their economic expertise.  But this time, there was a difference 
of where they were recruited from.  During the post-martial law period a number of 
them came from the banking sector leading to the phenomenon of investment banking 
 millionaires-turned-technocrats.  Thus, if the martial law technocrats came from modest 
background, for example, Virata and Sicat were UP academics, a number of post-martial 
law technocrats, after making their millions as investment bankers, would take on gov-
ernment positions.  This was the case, for example, of President Arroyo’s former Finance 
Minister Isidro Camacho43) from 2001 to 2003, and formerly of Deutsche Bank AG and 
Vincent Perez,44) Secretary of Energy from 2001 to 2005 and formerly with Lazard Freres 
& Co. as bond trader and investment banker.  An explanation for this is that in an era of 
globalization which characterizes the post-martial law years, one has witnessed the emer-
gence of multinational banks playing a crucial role in the economic policies of countries. 
This was different during the martial law period of the 1970s, when this was largely 
limited to the IMF and the WB.
In terms of the economic vision, the post-martial law technocrats shared the same 
concern of their martial law predecessors for a development paradigm which was market-
driven and was for an export-oriented industrialization and export-oriented agriculture 
(Bello 2010).  This, however, would be pursued under the neoliberal vision as it translated 
to a more open economy under the auspices of globalization, privatization, and the free 
market.  Another difference is the diminished role of the state as an authoritarian state-
42) The UPSE generally provided the technocrats for the position of Director General and Secretary 
of Planning of the NEDA, e.g., Cayetano Paderanga Jr. under the Aquino Administration.  Paderanga 
obtained his Ph.D. in Economics from Stanford University; Cielito F. Habito under the Ramos 
Administration.  He obtained his M.A. and Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University; Felipe 
Medalla who served under the Estrada Administration.  Medalla obtained his Ph.D. in Economic 
from Northwestern University; and Dante Canlas who served under the Arroyo Administration. 
Canlas obtained his Ph.D. in Economics from the UP.  UP academics would also be tapped for the 
position of Budget Secretary, e.g., Benjamin Diokno of the UPSE and the late Emilia Boncodin of 
the UP College of Public Administration and Governance during the Estrada and Arroyo Adminis-
trations respectively.
43) Camacho obtained an MBA from Harvard University.
44) Vincent S. Perez for 17 years worked as credit analysis, investment banker, debt trader and private 
equity investor.  He obtained his Bachelor’s degree in business economics from the UP, Diliman 
and an MBA from the Wharton Business School of the University of Pennsylvania in 1983.
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led development during the Marcos period which was associated with cronyism and 
patronage politics and inefficiency.  Thus, the goal was to seek state transformation into 
a minimalist and a regulatory state.  This is because the liberal doctrine, as embodied in 
the tenets of globalization, argues that there should be no government intervention with 
market forces for economic growth to occur.  Furthermore, market imperfections are 
not justifications to intrusive regulations because the interplay of competitive forces will 
benefit the consumers in the long run.  Moreover, for the neoliberal agenda, the state is 
“less concerned with issues of sovereignty and power than with creating efficient insti-
tutional structures to facilitate the operation of the market.”45)
Criticisms from Civil Society
Whereas during the martial law period such an economic ideology received criticisms 
from the left movement, during the post-martial law period, the neoliberal paradigm is 
heavily criticized by civil society.  Its critics during these two periods gave similar reasons 
foremost of which that such a development paradigm is unable to create political oppor-
tunity for long term development.  A reason for this is that foreign investors can easily 
leave the host country when the latter ceases to provide them the optimum environment 
for capital accumulation.  “Moreover, emphasis on export would give less attention to 
the development of a domestic mass following for local products” (Lopez Wui 2006). 
Another argument is that although the emphasis on export could create more employ-
ment for the local workforce because of bigger markets abroad, problems nonetheless 
arise if importing countries begin to tap other sources offering better quality and priced 
goods (ibid., 111).  Critics of the neoliberal paradigm have pointed out that creating a 
favorable environment could also mean the repression of workers’ wages.  And lastly, 
the economic policies which the technocrats are propagating are viewed as not address-
ing the problem of economic redistribution.  The argument is that such policies rely on 
the trickle-down effect which critics argue never seems to happen.  Some view it as even 
compounding further inequalities with advantages being given the private over the  public 
sphere.46)  Unlike the criticisms during the martial law period which could be parried by 
45) Reid (2001, 788) in Ariate (2006).
46) The technocratic policies for economic development has until now failed to address the socio-
economic inequalities which characterize Philippine society.  Statistics reveal that “the richest five 
per cent of the households’ account for nearly a third of the national income and the poorest 25 per 
cent of the households getting only six per cent of the income.”  This is according to the World 
Bank’s WB Development Report of 2005 (Dumlao 2005).  Furthermore, 24.7% of the population are 
considered officially poor (government statistics) while 70% rate themselves poor based on a Pulse 
Asia Survey (Newsbreak, May 23, 2005, 14).
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repressive policies, the same cannot be said for the economic managers in the post-
martial law period.  Their economic policies are not only questioned by civil society but 
also subjected to interrogation of Congress as part of the checks-and-balance which goes 
with a presidential system.
A. Factors Which Strengthen Economic Decision-Making of Technocrats in the Post-
Martial Law Period47)
Despite such a political milieu, however, there are factors in the current dispensation 
which shield the post-martial law technocracy from intervention in the decision-making 
process.  These include the following:
The Ideological Hegemony of Neoliberalism
One is the very dominance of the neoliberal ideology among crucial policy-makers.48) 
Unlike the martial law period whereby the liberal market ideology seemed to be the 
monopoly of the martial law technocrat, this is not the case during the post-martial law 
period.  What has emerged is that the tenets of neoliberalism “is not only tenaciously 
adhered to but also nurtured by like-minded academic experts, think-tanks and consul-
tancy firms working closely with government” (Quinsaat 2006, 33).  The Philippine 
Congress is also composed of legislators who are advocates of the neoliberal doctrine. 
Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, when she was Senator, was responsible for 
sponsoring bills paving the entry of the Philippines into the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).  Her closest economic adviser Representative Joey S. Salcedo of Albay, a former 
Wall Street stock market investor, has single-handedly pushed for legislative measures 
with the participation of the UPSE in minimizing the role of the state in the economy. 
Thus, the reality is that “only a handful of actors has monopoly in decision-making and 
these are mostly technocrats appointed by a President.  While some interest groups are 
able to permeate the arena, these are mostly the privileged and powerful, such as the 
landlord-controlled sugar industry lobbyists” (ibid.).
The Nature of the Policy Environment
A second factor which shields the post-martial law technocrats from interference in their 
decision-making process is the policy environment itself.  As pointed out, “while the law 
may appear sufficient, even socially progressive, equally important are the openness and 
hospitality of the politico-administrative environment to civil society participation in 
47) For further details, please see Lopez Wui et al. (2006).
48) For further details, please see Tadem (2005).
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policymaking.”49)  This is the case, for example, of civil society groups which are fighting 
against the privatization thrust of the technocracy.  In the case of the privatization of the 
water sector, the reality for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is that they have 
been generally locked out of crucial negotiations between the government and private 
concessionaires when they were trying to reach a compromise because of the failure of 
the latter to perform its tasks.  As pointed out by Jude Esguerra of the Bantay Tubig 
(Guard the Water) Network,
the entire regulatory and arbitration set-up was to blame for the absence of transparency and 
consumer representation in dispute-settlement processes related to water issues.  Consumers and 
taxpayers have been deprived of our right to have our grievances heard, while water companies 
can have the arbitration panel convened whenever they are unhappy with the decisions of the 
Regulatory Office.50)
Economic Policy-Making in a Period of Globalization
What has further protected technocracy from public criticism is the transnational char-
acter of economic policy-making, i.e.,
the economic policymaking has created a state of affairs where the Philippine government is more 
accountable to the institutions of global governance, such as the World Bank (WB), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and WTO, alongside the states which exercise hegemony within and over 
these establishments, than to its citizens.  Relationships with these players in the global trade 
regime are bestowed with so much importance, either by intention or by sheer mendicancy of the 
government, such that responsibility to its public is often compromised. (Quinsaat 2006, 33)
The motto of these international financial institutions (hereinafter referred to as IFIs) is 
to insulate the technocrats from the political pressure on economic decision-making. 
Thus, even if the country is in a political crisis, the measures are still there to keep the 
economy going.  This is certainly a déjà vu of the martial law period whereby the tech-
nocrats found its strength from the support of the IMF and the WB when it was besieged 
by criticisms of its policies not only from the Marcos cronies but also from the business 
community and the social movements.  The neoliberal ideology is also preserved by the 
bilateral agreements forged by the Philippines with countries particularly the United 
States which single-handedly has insulated any attempt to subvert the technocrat’s 
liberali zation policy.  This was seen, for example, when upon pressure from civil society 
actors in the local hog industry, the government attempted to secure protection for the 
49) Brillantes (1997) in Quinsaat (2006).
50) Bantay Tubig Network (August 9, 2003).
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hog industry imports.  This was effectively shot down by the United States, the country’s 
most influential trading partner (Ariate 2006).
B. Civil Society Challenges to Technocratic Economic Decision-Making in a Period of 
Democratization51)
Despite all these “safeguards” to technocratic policy-making, the reality is that in a period 
of democratization one still has to continue to deal with political interest groups which 
they view as “the virtual enemy of rational social organizations.”  The challenge for tech-
nocracy in the democratization process is to replace political and interest group leaders 
with technical trained experts who “stand above” the political process” (Fischer 1989, 
24).  Such is an arduous task for the technocracy because as the country democratizes, 
civil society members are able to explore ways and means by which they intervene in 
the nature of economic decision-making during the post-martial law period.  The most 
lethal combination is when they are able to team up with national and local officials as well 
as legislators who do not agree or are adversely affected by the technocrat’s economic 
policies.
Transparency and Accountability in a Period of Democratization
The 1986 People Power Revolution which toppled the dictator and the ouster of President 
Joseph Estrada in 2001 for corruption has given impetus to civil society to raise the issue 
of the need for transparency and accountability in government in general and on its eco-
nomic policy-makers in particular.  This was depicted in civil society’s vigilance with 
regards to the transparency and accountability of technocracy in cash rich government-
owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs).  Technocrats occupying positions in GOCCs 
are now heavily scrutinized specially when their respective GOCCs are losing money52) 
or even bankrupt like the Social Security System (SSS) and the Government Service 
Insurance System (GSIS).  Every month, around 10% to 30% is withheld from govern-
ment and private sector employees which go to the GSIS and the SSS respectively for 
their pension fund.  The accusation is that these GOCCs employ technocrats who pay 
themselves high salaries, e.g., USD9,000/month, when these GOCCs are losing money. 
51) For further details, please see Lopez Wui and Tadem (2006).
52) The bulk of the country’s deficit is accounted for by the national government at P67.5 billion and 
the 14 monitored GOCCs with a registered aggregate deficit of P9.6 billion.  There are a total of 76 
GOCCs.  Among the 14-monitored GOCCs are the Philippine National Oil Co. (PNOC), the Philip-
pine Economic Zone, the Manila Waterworks and Sewerage System, the National Power Corp., the 
National Housing Authority, the Light Rail Transit Authority, and the Philippine Ports Authority 
(Lema 2005, S1/1).
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The perception is that it is alright to pay these technocrats this amount if the GOCC was 
earning money, recognizing the fact that “the best and the brightest” can only be enticed 
to work for government if the pay can be more or less equal than that of the private  sector. 
The problem, however, was that this was not the case with the GOCCs.  Thus, this was 
such an “immoral” thing to do particularly when the average Filipino employee earns 
less than USD200/month (Ibon Facts and Figures 1984, 7).
The Adverse Effects of Globalization
The adverse effects of the technocrat’s push for the country’s rapid globalization has also 
brought about the alliances of civil society with major political actors to counter act this 
among which are the following:
Alliance of civil society and local government officials.  Civil society has allied with local 
government officials whose communities have been adversely affected by the country’s 
liberalization policy.  This was seen in the case of the Benguet vegetable industry in 
Northern Luzon.
Seeing that the industry could no longer compete with the influx of the imports of cheaper vege-
tables, the local government officials linked up with the communities and civil society groups like 
the Fair Trade Alliance (FTA),53) through its convener, former Senator Wigberto Tañada and the 
Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (Peasant Movement of the Philippines [KMP]), through its 
chairperson, Rafael Mariano.54)
FTA was instrumental in the preparation of position papers, particularly on the trigger price55) for 
vegetables.  The alliance also facilitated its participation in consultations in various agencies and 
institutions. (Quinsaat 2006, 40)
Alliance of civil society with legislators.  Another way by which civil society exerted its 
pressure on technocratic policies on globalization was through its alliance with sympa-
thetic legislators.  Although in general, the legislators accept the technocrats’ neoliberal 
vision, there are also those who do not agree with it and bring out their opposition in the 
53) “FTA is a coalition of various industries, businessmen, labor unions, and NGOs working to review 
and reverse the country’s trade policies and commitments in order to provide better protection for 
local industries” (Quinsaat 2006, 40).
54) Raul Molintas (Former Governor, Province of Benguet).  2004.  Interview by the Sharon Quinsaat. 
September 28 (Quinsaat 2006); Johnny Uy (Board Member, Province of Benguet).  2004.  Interview 
by Sharon Quinsaat.  Tape recording.  September 21 (ibid.).
55) Trigger prices are levels that determine supply situation in the market.  Once a trigger price is 
breached, importation is allowed (Cabreza 2002).
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legislature.  This was seen in the case of the Benguet vegetable industry whereby
the relentless lobbying of like-minded legislators, mainly from party-list groups such as Represent-
atives Loretta Rosales of Akbayan and Satur Ocampo of Bayan Muna, in tandem with a privilege 
speech delivered by Benguet solon Samuel Dangwa underscored the impact of vegetable importa-
tion to the livelihood of the farmers. (ibid., 45)
Rosales also criticized the secrecy of government in its WTO negotiating positions 
and gave the problems of the vegetable industry ample space in the legislative arena 
(ibid.).
Alliance of civil society with transnational activists.  The era of globalization has also seen 
the alliance of civil society with transnational activists in questioning the technocrat’s plan 
of action.  An example of this is
the Labor Forum Beyond MFA56) which was formed in early 2003 through the efforts of the Inter-
national Textile, Garment and Leather Workers’ Federation (ITGLWF) Philippines in order to 
examine problems experienced by the garment industry in view of the expiration of the MFA and 
to prepare the workers for the quota phase out. . . . (Lopez Wui 2006, 133)
The important objectives of the dialogues are for the labor organizations to engage in 
collective action and assess the efforts of employers and government in connection 
with the quota phase-out.  The outcome of all these dialogues was the revival and rees-
tablishment of the Clothing and Textile Industry Tripartite Council (CTITC) (ibid., 
135).
Civil society alliances within the business community.  Like the martial law period, there 
are members of the business community who are also critical of technocratic policies 
which impinge on their profits.  In particular, a similar issue which has emerged in the 
post-martial law period is their objection towards the policy on trade liberalization, par-
ticularly, the entry of cheaper imported products.  It is with this sector of the business 
community where alliances have been formed as can be seen for example in the hog 
industry with the emergence of the Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines (ASAP) 
in 2001.  ASAP consists mainly of feed miller’s and hog raiser’s associations and coop-
eratives, and other civil society actors in the industry.  They launched a confrontational 
posture against the state with regards to the importation of cheaper meat products. 
56) The Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) grants favorable quotas to Philippine garment exports.  This, 
however, expired in January 2005 upon the country’s ascension to the rules of the WTO (Lopez Wui 
2006, 112).
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Another alliance formed in 2004 was the Meat and Hog Dealers Association of the Philip-
pines (MHDAP) which together with the Slaughterhouse Operators Association of the 
Philippines (SOAP) would figure prominently in a meat holiday in March 2004 (Ariate 
2006, 94).
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis
The 1997 Asian financial crisis also severely questioned the soundness of technocratic 
policies espousing rapid economic liberalization.  In light of this, civil society have called 
for the need to institute safety nets to cushion the blow of liberalization.  Moreover, the 
perception is that government should not lower the tariffs for imports without its regard 
for its effects on the local industry (Lopez Wui 2006, 111).  These arguments have put 
pressure on the need for the state to take on its responsibility towards the underprivi-
leged and to preserve public interest.  Thus, unlike the neoliberal perspective, the state 
should not wither away but assert its role vis-à-vis the forces of globalization particularly 
in the aspect of imposing strong social regulation.
Civil society in alliance with sympathetic fellow technocrats.  It is within this context that 
civil society is able to forge alliances with sympathetic technocrats who are not com-
pletely sold out to the neoliberal ideology and believe that safety nets and strong govern-
ment social regulation is needed as opposed to the unbridled unleashing of the economic 
forces of globalization and the market economy.  One of this is former NEDA Secretary 
General of the Ramos Administration Cielito Habito.  Another is former DTI and Depart-
ment of Agriculture (DA) Undersecretary Ernesto Ordonez.  As noted in the experience 
of the Benguet vegetable farmers, Ordonez was deemed as the most sympathetic to their 
plight “because of his instantaneous response to the problem of importation.57)  He was 
active in bridging the gap between the agency and civil society and was key to the latter’s 
influencing decisions in the DA.”58)  This situation is quite different as compared to the 
martial law period whereby although there were factions within the Philippine technoc-
racy in terms of economic perspectives, none of these factions allied with members of 
civil society or social movement players.
Civil society and electoral candidates.  Unlike the martial law period, another factor which 
57) Alangdeo, Alfredo (Chair, Benguet Vegetable Distributors’ Cooperative).  2004.  Interview by  Sharon 
Quinsaat.  Tape recording.  September 21 (Quinsaat 2006); Kim, John (Board Member, Province of 
Benguet).  2004.  Interview by Sharon Quinsaat.  Tape recording.  September 20 (ibid.).
58) Fongwan, Nestor (Mayor, Municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet).  2004.  Interview by Sharon 
 Quinsaat.  Tape recording.  September 22 (Quinsaat 2006).
T. S. E. Tadem366
impinges on the technocracy’s economic decision-making is electoral politics.  Economic 
policies, for example, tend to be sacrificed by technocrats who have political ambitions. 
This was in the case of “former Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) Secretary 
Manuel ‘Mar’ Roxas, who although is a supporter of consumer-oriented globalization was 
opposed to increase in tariff rates . . .” (Quinsaat 2006, 43).  When civil society support-
ing the Benguet vegetable industry went against cheap vegetable importation found out 
that Roxas had political aspirations and with national elections fast approaching, civil 
society together with the local officials, “tried to win over Roxas by insinuating that the 
support of the Cordillera59) voting public would be dependent on his stance on further 
trade liberalization in agriculture, especially vegetables.  Thus in the end, he capitulated 
and supported the actions of civil society” (ibid., 44).
The Failure of the WTO Uruguay Round
The failure of the Philippines to pursue economic gains during the WTO Uruguay Round 
whereby civil-society groups were locked out of the domestic negotiation process, 
resulted in a highly controversial and tumultuous battle on the ratification of the treaty 
in 1994 (Cajiuat and Regalado 1997).  The trade representatives were castigated for 
keeping the public in the dark on the various concessions they had signed up the Philip-
pines into.  They earned the ire not just of social movements but industries as well.  As 
a consequence, the implementation of the GATT-UR lacked the requisite support from 
its stakeholders.  Thus, there are technocrats in government who believe that sound 
economic policy-making can only be with the support of its stakeholders.  This was the 
case of DA Undersecretary Segfredo Serrano who formed the Task Force on the 
(Re)negotiations of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture or TFWAAR in 1998 (which 
later became TF-WAR in 2001) to include stakeholders who are directly affected by the 
WTO to be part of the shaping of the Philip pine negotiating strategy in the WTO.  The 
motto of the TF-WAR is not to “junk” the WTO but to assume a “protectionist” and 
“defensive” position in the negotiating process.  Technocrats like Serrano exemplify as 
“reformist” technocrats who are not hardcore neoliberals and are open to other para-
digms.60)
C. Patronage Politics and Technocratic Decision-Making61)
The bigger challenge, however, for technocracy during the post-martial law period is 
59) Benguet province is part of the Cordillera region in Northern Luzon.
60) Please see Borras Jr. (1998).  Please also see Tadem (2009; 2010b).
61) For further details, please see Tadem (2010a).
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the prevalence of patronage politics which continues to impinge on technocratic decision-
making which was exacerbated during the martial law period.  The technocrats, in gen-
eral, have to continue to contend with what is referred to as a “patrimonial state,” i.e., 
“where practically everything depends explicitly upon personal considerations.”62)   During 
the post-martial law period, it was hoped that crony capitalism will disappear with the 
advent of globalization.  But this, however, is not the case as globalization has failed to 
address the problem of such a state which is lacking the “vision, autonomy and bureau-
cratic capacity necessary to implement a developmental program” (Budd 2005).  The 
reality is that globalization has only promoted capitalism but not the institutions that are 
necessary for democratic consolidation (ibid., 54).  A result of this is the emergence of 
partisan politics which has taken its toll on the implementation of economic policies. 
This can be seen in the attempt of the technocrats to provide an efficient and regulatory 
state which “uses rules, standards and other public statements as major policy instru-
ments, rather than relying on direct provision of goods and services” (Hague and Harrop 
2004, 318).  The challenge here is that the regulatory agency is able to insulate itself from 
external and social forces which may adversely affect the implementation of coherent 
and effective policies (Molmisa 2006, 167–168).  This can be seen in the case of the 
National Tele communications Commission (NTC), the regulatory body in-charge of 
the telecommunications industry.  Although the NTC’s strength can be seen in its 
effort to implement measures to combat mobile text frauds,63) which according to the 
Anti-Money Laundering, have ripped about P5 million from the victims in 2003,64) it 
also continues to be affected by partisan politics.  “At present, the term of appointment 
of commissioners depends on the confidence of the President of the country.  The 
 Congress can also determine its annual budget appropriations.”65)  This opens the NTC 
to influence- peddling and rent-seeking activities particularly in securing a legislative 
franchise (ibid., 169).
62) Weber (1968, 104) in Budd (2005).
63) “Under the text scam, hoax messages are being sent to the unsuspecting victims using the name 
of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of the Philippines), the Philippine Charity Sweep-
stakes, the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) and other institutions 
 advising the victims about winning a huge amount of prize. The swindlers often instruct their prey 
that the latter should first deposit a considerable sum of money to the former’s bank account, 
 allegedly for tax payments and other fees as a requirement to getting the prize” (Molmisa 2006, 
190).
64) Today (April 16, 2004).
65) Esfahani (1994) in Molmisa (2006).
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The Political Crisis of Legitimacy
Such a situation is severely aggravated when there is a crisis of leadership.  Generally,
the state is seen as the institution that can stand above the destructive play of competitive interests 
and thus only the state is potentially capable of providing the coordinating leadership needed to 
oversee a complex technical societal process. (Fischer 1989, 12)
Such a role, however, cannot be performed by the state when there is a crisis of leader-
ship which seems to have always sealed the fate of Philippine technocracy.  This was 
seen during the martial law years when President Ferdinand Marcos was removed in 
office by the 1986 People Power Revolution.  Together with him went the technocrats. 
The same could be said for President Joseph Estrada’s technocrats in Cabinet who were 
replaced in the advent of the EDSA 2 Revolution in January 2001.  Almost the same fate 
seems to lie with the technocrats of the Arroyo Administration.  Because of the ques-
tions raised whether she is truly the President of the Philippines, having come to 
power because of a popular uprising, President Arroyo was very much determined to 
win a formidable mandate during the 2004 national elections.  Because of this, the 
perception was that she wanted to win at all cost.  One of the first casualty of this was 
Finance  Secretary Isidro Camacho who resigned a couple of months before the 2004 
national elections saying that economic policies could not be implemented until after 
the elections.  This implied that economic policies should give way to political consider-
ations.
After the elections, there was hope that the government’s economic policies could 
now be implemented but her administration was plagued with a series of scandals which 
broke out beginning in April 2005.  Foremost of this was the “jueteng gate” and “Hello 
Garci Tapes” scandals.  Jueteng, which is an illegal numbers gambling game and is mainly 
condemned by the Church, is said to have benefited the President’s relatives, that is her 
husband, First Gentleman Jose Miguel “Mike” Arroyo, her eldest son and Pampanga 
Vice-Governor Juan Miguel “Mikey” Arroyo, and her brother-in-law, Negros Repre-
sentative Ignacio “Iggy” Arroyo.  They were accused of receiving millions of pesos 
 coming from jueteng proceeds.  Jueteng was the same issue which brought down President 
Estrada.  The jueteng scandal, however, was nothing compared to the “Hello Garci Tapes” 
scandal which followed it in May 2005.  This was with regards to wire-tapped tapes 
which revealed President Arroyo talking on the cellphone to Commission on Elections 
 (COMELEC) Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano during the counting of the ballots in the 
May 2004 national elections.  Garcillano was based in Lanao del Norte, Mindanao.  The 
public perception was that she was asking Garcillano to pad the votes so she could win 
by at least one million votes giving her a formidable mandate over her closest opponent, 
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the actor Fernando Poe Jr.66)
Because the political scandal was getting in the way of implementing the govern-
ment’s economic policies, President Arroyo’s economic and social technocrats67) pres-
sured her to confess to the public that indeed it was her voice and to apologize for this in 
the hope that this will lessen the backlash.  They believed that this was causing political 
instability which hindered the implementation of their economic policies.  President 
Arroyo agreed and said she was “sorry” to the public for her “lapse of judgment.”  The 
technocrats went a step further by demanding the President to send her husband away 
because of the jueteng scandal among others, and to fire officials identified with him 
such as Edgar Manda of the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) and Efraim 
 Genuino of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp. (PAGCOR).68)  Her husband 
agreed to going away but “vigorously opposed the sacking of officials identified with him.” 
When it became clear to the technocrats that President Arroyo was not going to let go 
of her husband’s cronies, particularly, Genuino, 10 of them, seven Cabinet Secretaries 
and three Bureau Directors, resigned on July 10, 2005 and held a conference at the Hyatt 
Hotel to announce their resignation.  They became known as the “Hyatt 10” (Lirio 2005) 
and they were led by Cesar Purisima,69) President Arroyo’s former Secretary of Trade 
and Industry who later on became the Secretary of Finance when Camacho resigned. 
Purisima said that he could no longer stomach the politics which was going on which 
sacrificed the economic policies which were already set in place and read the group’s 
66) There was an order from a very powerful figure in Malacanang to wiretap the cellphone of Garcillano 
who was given millions to run the special operations for the May 10, 2004 elections to ensure 
President Arroyo’s victory (Zamora 2005, A6).
67) The economic and social technocrats included Secretaries Cesar Purisima (finance), Florencio Abad 
(education), Corazon “Dinky” Soliman (social welfare), and Emilia Boncodin (budget), and presi-
dential adviser on the peace process Teresita “Ging” Delez. They urged Ms Arroyo to address the 
“Hello Garci” controversy (Lirio 2005, A4).
68) Genuino is reported to have delivered jueteng money to church leaders including Cardinal Ricardo 
Vidal of Cebu. Vidal justified this by saying that the money he received from PAGCOR went to 
development projects. He also said he stopped accepting money from PAGCOR when the Catholic 
Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) resolved that no one in the Church should receive 
donations which come from gambling money. Genuino was also reported to have made 15 calls to 
Garcillano from May 25 to June 14, 2004 in his effort to put “Bigkis Pinoy Movement,” a party-list 
hopeful founded by him (Genuino) and Mike Arroyo’s close allies, in the winning circle (The News-
break Team 2005, 25).
69) Purisima used to be the Chair of Sycip, Golez and Velayo (SGV), the country’s top accounting firm. 
The “Hyatt 10” consisted of the economic and social technocrats who called for President Arroyo 
to confess to the “Hello Garci” tapes as well as Trade Secretary Juan Santos, Agrarian Reform 
Secretary Juan Villa, National Anti-Poverty Commission Chair Imelda Nicolas (sister of Carnation 
Inc. President Loida Nicolas Lewis), Internal Revenue Commissioner Guillermo Parayno Jr., and 
Customs Commissioner Alberto Lina.
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statement entitled “Of Leadership and Credibility.”  The others who called for her 
 resignation was former President Aquino and members of the Makati Business Club 
(MBC).70)
The “Hello Garci Tapes” scandal, thus, brings forth the reincarnation of the martial 
law years squabble between the technocrats and the cronies.  During the martial law 
years, close relatives and cronies of President Marcos benefited from government-
awarded contracts and outright corruption to the chagrin of the technocrats and the 
IMF/WB.  Such a practice seems to have continued during the post-martial law period. 
President Aquino, for example, has been accused of having her “Kamag-anak Inc” 
 (Relatives Incorporated), while some have found President Ramos guilty of granting 
independent power producer (IPP) contracts to close friends.  President Estrada was also 
known for his drinking sessions with friends who composed what was called his “midnight 
cabinet.”  It was during these “midnight cabinet” meetings whereby contracts would be 
signed according to his former Chief of Staff Aprodicio Laquian who was immediately 
fired after saying this publicly.  As for President Arroyo, her “Achilles heel” is said to 
be her husband, Mike Arroyo, who had a “Wednesday group” which some Palace staff 
members have referred to as the “Shadow Cabinet” (to distinguish it from the official 
Cabinet which meets every Tuesday) (ibid.).
There were technocrats, however, who stood by Mrs. Arroyo foremost of whom 
was Romulo Neri, a professor of Business Administration of the UP, Diliman.  Neri, when 
he was the Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and Director-General of the NEDA was 
implicated in a corruption scandal involving a Chinese corporation ZTE with regards to 
a bid to implement a national broadband network (NBN) in the Philippines.  Upon his 
interrogation by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Neri disclosed to the Committee 
members that he told President Arroyo that Commission on Election (Comelec) Chair 
Benjamin Abalos, offered him P200 million (USD45 million) to approve the deal.  Referred 
to as the ZTE-NBN scandal, if approved, the Philippine government would have accepted 
to build the NBN at a cost of USD329 million, double the actual cost by some estimates, 
although the same project could have been built at no cost to the government.  Neri, 
however, refused to give full disclosure of Arroyo’s involvement in the ZTE-NBN deal.71) 
Furthermore, he invoked Executive Order (E.O.) 464 “which bars officials from testify-
70) Contreras et al. (2005, A1, A2). In a joint briefing on that day at the Peninsula Manila, the Makati 
Business Club (MBC) and the Financial Executives Institute of the Philippines (FINEX), the groups 
said that “the resignation of the Cabinet officials illustrates the loss of confidence in the President 
and her ability to advance economic and social development programs” (ibid., A1). The others who 
called for her resignation was former President Aquino and then Senate President Franklin Drilon.
71) (Doronila 2009, A1).
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ing in congressional inquiries without the President’s permission.”72)
“National Security” as Priority over Economic Policies
These scandals further magnified the “crisis of legitimacy” bringing about the call for the 
President’s impeachment.  Although the opposition in Congress lacked the numbers to 
impeach her, current Senate investigations of questionable government economic trans-
actions continue to bring forth the “vulnerability” of the present government.  Such a 
“vulnerability” plunged the President’s rating to as low as negative 74.7% with 65% of 
the public wanting her removed from office (Rivera 2005).  Some have looked at this as 
ripe for a military take-over.  Because of this, the Palace decided that economic reforms 
should now take second place to national security.  That is, the technocrats will now play 
second fiddle to government officials, i.e., the Palace’s political “spin doctors,” tasked to 
defend the presidency.73)  The adverse impact of such a political rearrangement on the 
decision-making powers of the technocracy were seen in the following instances:
“Flip-flopping” on the E-VAT Law
One of the economic policy casualties of the political crisis was the delayed implementa-
tion of the expanded value-added tax law74) or E-VAT law which is aimed to increase the 
revenues, particularly from taxes on fuel and power to solve the country’s fiscal deficit.75) 
It is also considered to be the Arroyo administration’s key measure to resolve the fiscal 
problem.  Although the imposition of the E-VAT law has been passed as a law by Con-
gress, it was suspended because a case was filed against it in the Supreme Court.76) 
Purisima and former Trade Secretary Juan Santos accused Malacanang of being behind 
such an action in the government’s attempt to assuage the public who would suffer from 
72) Doronila (2009, A1).
73) These include Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, Environment Secretary Mike Defensor, Chief 
of the Presidential Management Staff (PMS) Rigoberto Tiglao, and political adviser Gabriel Claudio. 
Transportation Secretary Leandro Mendoza and Public Works Secretary Hermogenes Ebdane, both 
of whom came from the military, were also recruited to the President’s inner circle, presumable to 
handle Garcillano and the “Hello Garci” witnesses (Lirio 2005, A4).
74) The E-VAT law is estimated to generate as much as P31 billion in incremental revenue in the 
second half of the year, and P105 billion annually starting in 2006. The law will also give President 
Arroyo a standby authority to raise the VAT rate from 10% to 12% next year (Remo 2005b, A7).
75) Under the proposed 2006 budget, “expenditures are placed at P1.09 trillion, while the expected 
revenue collection is at P968.6 billion, thus resulting in a deficit of P124.9 billion” (Remo 2005b, 
A7).
76) The Supreme Court thus issued a restraining order (RTO) which the Department of Finance wanted 
to contest (Remo 2005d, A1).
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the added tax on commodities.  This was one of the major reasons why both chose to 
resign.77)  Administration legislators, including her close economic advisers and the main 
backer of the E-VAT law Albay Representative Joey Salceda and former government 
technocrat Senator Manuel A. Roxas, have also filed separate resolutions on September 
16, 2005 to delay the implementation of the E-VAT law.  For Roxas and Salceda78) “includ-
ing petroleum and power sales in the E-VAT law’s coverage now would add misery to 
marginalized Filipinos already suffering from soaring transport expenses and electricity 
bills.  Such a position could be expected from these technocrats-turned-politicians 
because of the fear of a political backlash from their respective constituencies.   Malacanang 
was said to be open to such a proposal.79)  On October 18, 2005, however, the Supreme 
Court declared the E-VAT law as constitutional and the government has currently imple-
mented it.
Re-thinking Debt Payments
Because the political crisis came at the heels of the worldwide oil price hikes, the Arroyo 
administration also began to re-think economic policies which will further plunge the 
popularity rating of the President.  One of this re-thinking is in the area of debt payments. 
This is because the government has been allocating at least 30% of its annual budget to 
interest payments.  According to the Department of Finance, interest and principal debt 
eat up nearly 90% of government revenues (Remo 2005c).  In relation to this, Finance 
Secretary Margarito Teves80) said he was open to the idea of seeking debt relief as a 
partial solution to the country’s lingering fiscal problem.  He, however, added that “the 
77) Remo (2005d, A1). Purisima because of such a statement was charged with contempt by the 
Supreme Court. This was because the Supreme Court read his statement to mean that President 
Arroyo allegedly influenced the Supreme Court into suspending the implementation of the E-VAT 
law (Nocum 2005, A6). He was ordered to pay a fine of P30,000.
78) Both Roxas and Salceda are “former fund managers who remain in close contact with the financial 
community” (Cabacungan 2005a, A7). Salceda was a former student of President Arroyo in econom-
ics and is the principal conduit of policy advice of the UP School of Economics to President Arroyo 
in the formulation of the fiscal reform program (Salceda 2005).
79) Cabacungan (2005a, A1, A7). The call for the postponement of the E-VAT law also “comes at a time 
when a survey by the Social Weather Stations (SWS) from August 26 to September 5, 2005 showed 
that 15.5 per cent of the households nationwide consider themselves as having ‘experienced hunger’ 
or nothing to eat at least once in the past three months” (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2005a, A1).
80) Teves’ appointment as Finance Secretary to succeed Purisima was hailed by the business com-
munity. For Albay Representative Joey Salceda, American-educated Teves as a banker is respected 
in the business community. “As a practicing economist, he has the confidence of financial markets 
and credit rating agencies. As a three-term congressman, he has the skills to navigate difficult fiscal 
reforms through the legislative mill” (Cabacungan and Remo 2005, A1).
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task of communication with foreign creditors regarding the possibility of relieving some 
of the Philippines’ external debts, however, should be left with people outside the govern-
ment’s economic team.” Such a position was a turnaround from Teves’ predecessor 
Purisima who said that seeking debt relief could adversely affect the country’s capability 
to access future loans.81)  Then Speaker of the House of Representative Jose de Venecia, 
on the other hand, introduced a “debt-for-equity-swap” proposal which was announced 
in August 2005 in President Arroyo’s five-minute speech at the United Nations (UN) 
General Assembly.  Under such a proposal, “. . . the debt service, or principal amount, 
should be converted into equity in new projects of at least equal value and with their 
potential earnings.”  These are specifically intended to finance programs under the UN’s 
Millennium Development Goals which aims to reduce the incidence of poverty in the 
world by half by 2015.82)
D. The Failure of Technocratic Policies to Address Poverty and Socio-economic Inequalities
In the meantime though, for the post-martial law technocrats, the reality staring them in 
the face is that the billionaires during the time of Marcos are still the billionaires now.83) 
These criticisms are vindicated with the failure of the economic policies of the post-
martial law technocrats to address the country’s worsening poverty where 27 million or 
nearly a third of the population of 92 million live in poverty (Esguerra 2010).  As the 
Arroyo government departed, the government incurred a P162 billion deficit which is 
55% or more than half of the targeted P293 billion in total (Bello 2010).  On a comparative 
perspective, “the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Report 
revealed that the Philippines registered the lowest average yearly growth rate, 1.6 per 
cent in Southeast Asia in the period of 1990–2005.  This was lower than Vietnam (5.9%), 
Cambodia (5.5%) and Burma (6.6%)” (ibid.).  The technocratic policies for economic 
development has also failed to address the socio-economic inequalities which has peren-
nially characterized Philippine society.  Statistics reveal that “the richest five per cent of 
the households’ account for nearly a third of the national income and the poorest 25 per 
cent of the households getting only six per cent of the income.”  This is according to the 
World Bank’s WB Development Report of 2006 (Dumlao 2005).  These socio- economic 
inequalities have also been exacerbated by the end of the Arroyo Adminis tration in June 
81) Remo (2005c). The WB has earlier on “discouraged the Philippines from talking about debt relief, 
saying it was counter-productive. Unlike Africa, WB country director Joachim von Amsberg said 
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2010.  Although the country’s economic growth “hit an unexpected high of 7.3% during 
the first quarter of 2010, this was credited to her controlling the runaway budget deficit, 
largely through the passage of key fiscal reforms in 2005 despite widespread opposition” 
(Macaraig 2010).  But as noted by UP economist, Cayetano Paderanga Jr. and now, the 
new Aquino government’s Secretary of Economic Planning, much of the growth came 
from a few sectors, namely the remittances from millions of Filipino overseas workers84) 
and a flow-on boom in consumer spending, plus earnings from call centers and other 
outsourced business.  “These sectors, though, are all out of reach of the millions of poor, 
who have largely missed out on any benefits of economic growth” according to Paderanga 
and the Dean of UPSE Arsenio Balisacan (ibid.).
Conclusion
This article has, therefore, shown the factors which have strengthened as well as weak-
ened the political clout of Philippine technocracy during the martial law and post-martial 
law periods.  During the pre-martial law period, technocracy drew its strength from the 
support of the leadership which shared its vision for economic development.  The con-
tentions which ensued here were between two factions of technocracy, i.e., the techno-
crats in the NEC which were for an import-substitution and heavy industrialization policy 
as against the technocrats in the PIA and later on the PES, which favored an export-
oriented industrialization, liberalization, and more incentives for foreign incentives. 
Under President Marcos, the latter faction of technocracy was favored.  For this faction, 
the other political hurdle to technocratic economic policy-making during this period was 
Congress where one had politicians who had economic interests which went against their 
development policy as well as those who were nationalists and opposed to the incursion 
of multinational corporations in the country.  But their opposition was readily overcome 
because of the political acumen of Marcos in dealing with them which was buttressed by 
the leadership’s received his political allies in Congress.
With the declaration of martial law, the strength of technocracy continued to draw 
from the support it received from the leadership.  It, however, would also encounter 
opposition to its policies but of a different kind as during the pre-martial law period.  The 
84) Because of the failure of technocracy to address poverty in the country, there continues to be the 
exodus of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) “which began in the 1970s during the martial law 
period and which persists today.”  The estimated 8.2 to 11 million OFWs are considered to be the 
country’s number one “export.”  As of 2009, their remittance amounted to USD1.5 billion per 
month or a total of P17,348,052 billion for 2009 (POEA 2010).
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“martial law” technocrats, for example, as represented by the Virata faction no longer 
had to deal with technocrats espousing import-substitution as well as political opposition 
from Congress which was abolished but it had to deal with other technocrats who had 
other economic perspectives and had their own pipeline to the President.  Thus, there 
was no solid technocratic bloc.  Like during the pre-martial law period, technocratic 
policy also had to give way to patronage politics as in the favoring of crony interests 
particularly in the very vital sugar and coconut industries and to the interests of the 
leadership’s relatives as epitomized by no less than the First Lady Mrs. Marcos.  Like 
during the pre-martial law period, the martial law technocrats would pursue the IMF and 
WB line of development and because of this, they received the assistance needed by the 
country for their economic objectives.  Their role as the facilitator of IMF and WB loans 
to the country was the major political leverage of the Virata faction of the technocracy. 
Such a political leverage would be translated into the perception of technocracy as the 
bulwark against corruption in government.  Economic and political crisis would wreak 
havoc on the political clout of the technocrats.  In the case of the former, the global eco-
nomic crisis would severely impinge on the local economy and the capacity of the tech-
nocrats to access the needed loans for the country.  The situation was further aggravated 
with the country’s political crisis as triggered by the assassination of ex-Senator Benigno 
Aquino and Marcos’ failing health.  All these gave further fuel to the burgeoning anti-
dictatorship movement as brought about by the regime’s human right’s violations, cor-
ruption, and failed economic policies leading to the downfall of the dictatorship and with 
him, his technocrats.
During the post-martial law period, the technocrats’ political leverage would also 
continue to rely heavily on the support it gets from the leadership.  But unlike the mar-
tial law period, their economic vision of neoliberalism would also be carried by not only 
the executive but also the majority in Philippine Congress and in other important sectors 
of society such as the business community and the academe.  As during the martial law 
period, their economic ideology would be perpetuated externally by institutions of global 
governance such as the IMF, the WB, and the WTO as well as multinational banks.  If 
the left movement during the martial law period spearheaded the opposition against 
technocratic policies under the umbrella of the anti-dictatorship movement, in a period 
of democratization, this was carried out by civil society.  The failure of the technocrat’s 
economic policies to address poverty and socio-economic inequalities as exacerbated by 
the adverse effects of globalization as epitomized by the 1997 Asian financial crisis 
brought about the emergence of civil society alliances with prominent allies sympathetic 
to their cause.  These include local government officials, legislators, fellow technocrats, 
members of the business community, electoral candidates, and transnational activists 
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among others.
The other formidable challenge to technocratic decision-making continues to be 
patronage politics and massive corruption which characterizes Philippine society.  More 
often than not, this continues to sacrifice economic policies.  Such a situation is further 
aggravated by the political crisis of legitimacy which has brought down another Philippine 
president and with him his technocrats.  In the case of President Arroyo, the crisis of 
political legitimacy as brought about by political and economic scandals has witnessed 
priority being given to “national security” over economic policies.  The mass resignation 
of key economic and social technocrats under the Arroyo Administration because of the 
issue of corruption was the first in Philippine history which highlights the political leeway 
which technocrats are able to pursue in a period of democratization.  Furthermore, these 
technocrats actively campaigned for the ouster of President Arroyo and failing to do so, 
heavily campaigned for the election of President Benigno S. Aquino.  With the latter’s 
victory, these former Arroyo technocrats are now back in power.  The challenge now is 
for the Aquino administration’s technocrats to show that it is politics and not economics 
which is to blame why the Philippines continues to be the basket case of Asia.
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